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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 220

Accident time: 15:50

Accident Date: 17/12/1997

Where it occurred: Gluva Smokva village,
Route 20, Trebinje
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina
Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: PP/MA/DS

Date of main report: 20/12/1997
Name of source: BiH MAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast

Ground condition: building rubble
electromagnetic
residential/urban

Date record created: 16/02/2004

Date last modified: 16/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR: BN 743 291

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: Dubrovnik

Map series: M709

Map edition: 6-DMA

Map sheet: 2780 111

Map name: 1:50,000

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
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Accident report
The demining group was running two-man teams operating a one man drill in which one
deminer worked while the second "controlled" him.
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the UN MAC and carried out by representatives of
the QA group, an ex-pat Technical Advisor and UN MAC representative. Effectively, the
report was ordered by the MAC on one of its own operations and so no truly independent
report was made. The report was made available and the following summarises its content.
The full BoI report is under Related papers at the “Other documents” tab.
On the day of the accident it was cold and cloudy with little wind. The mine in the accident
was under the corner of a cement doorstep. According to the SOPs in force "doorways" were
house clearance and should be done by EOD teams, not area clearance teams. The
distinction was blurred. The team were clearing the yard of the house. Stone walls and a
"paved road" marked the extents. The stones in the ground were described as ranging in
size "from small pebbles to the size of a house".
At 15:50, while preparations were being made to stop work but while the victim should have
been "controlling" his partner, he left his observation position on the road and went to the
rest area to start tidying equipment, then went to urinate in "a private corner" of the cleared
area where he stood on a mine. A witness stated that he saw the victim "flying in the air". He
was attended quickly and evacuated by ambulance to Trebinje hospital, arriving within 15
minutes of the detonation.
The investigators decided that the mine have been a PMA-2 at a depth of 6cm [by
inference]. The concrete doorstep slab over the mine was 4cm thick and had been broken. If
it had been square, the mine could have been placed beneath it. If it had been rounded, the
fuse could have been exposed.
The investigators found that access lanes for the control of movement were not being used,
that supervision was less than required, and that proper rest and equipment areas were not
used with respect to house clearing restrictions. The team's rest area was within two metres
of an uncleared area (on the patio of the house) and there was no access lane through the
cleared area.
They found that the MD-8 detector and the prodder did not "function effectively" in the
ground at the site. The group should have been excavating but were using prodders. Other
tools available were bayonets, "trowels, field scissors.. [and].. small saws".

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the accident was "preventable". The mine should have
been found during excavation but the appropriate SOPs were not being used. Supervision
was inadequate and the control of movement in cleared areas was not in accordance with
SOPs.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that the platoon be retrained with emphasis on supervision
and excavating drills. That the appropriate SOPs be re-emphasised to every demining group
in the country, that the Technical Guides have Page numbers "adjusted" [presumably that
were wrong] and that a system for ease of reference be devised. They added, "since mine
detectors exist which do work in metallic soil, they should be procured". The deminers should
have been using an excavation technique, "in accordance with Technical Guidelines".

Victim Report
Victim number: 284

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
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Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 15 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: not recorded

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Leg
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the
victim was in breach of several rules and his errors were not corrected. Also, the field
controllers were apparently using the wrong clearance technique.
The investigators recognised that a "doorstep" is "house clearance" and should be cleared
by an EOD (or Battle Area Clearance) team, yet blamed the deminers for not clearing it. The
doorstep was flush with the ground and covered with earth in places. The deminers were
presumably supposed to clear up to it, but not on or under it. The "grey area" represents a
failing of the UN MAC's Technical guidelines. Accordingly, the secondary cause is listed as a
“Management/control inadequacy”.

Related papers
Other documents in the accident file included witness statements and photographs of the
accident site showing the shell of a two story concrete house. The photographs made it clear
that the "doorstep slab" was not raised, but at ground level and not immediately
distinguishable from the ground. The blast crater, appeared to be very shallow, barely as
high as the mine.
There were also several sketches of the site, one showing that the victim had left the
clearance area and walked some distance around a corner to a doorway not adjacent to the
rest area "patio" when the accident occurred.
Photographs and sketches were not made available for copying.

Original BoI report
What follows is the original BoI report, edited for anonymity.

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY ON THE UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION
CENTRE MINE ACCIDENT IN TREBINJE AREA 17 DECEMBER, 1997
Dated 20 Dec 97

A.

INTRODUCTION
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1.
A Board of Inquiry was convened by the United Nations Mine Action Centre on
17 December, 1997 to investigate the circumstances of a mine accident which occurred in the
Trebinje area, grid reference BN 743 291, 15:15 hours, 17 December, 1997. The Board was
convened on the authority of the [Demining group] Mine Clearance and EOD Operations
Technical and Safety Standards Guidelines, Annex A to Chapter 2, dated 1 Dec 97. A copy
of the convening order is attached as Annex A.
2.

The Board comprised:
a.
Chairman
b.
Member
c.
Member

Regional Mines Officer, [Demining group] Mostar
Technical Advisor, [Demining group] Mostar
Operations Assistant, [Demining group] Mostar

3.
The Board was assisted at the mine accident site on 18 Dec 97 by Maj [name
excised], an EOD expert from [Demining group], Sarajevo head office. Local assistance was
provided by [name excised] of [Demining group] Banja Luka Office throughout the field
investigations and interviews. The Board was assisted at the mine accident site on 20 Dec 97
by [name excised], an EOD expert from [Demining group] Mostar.
4.
The Board conducted its field investigation and interviews on 18 Dec 97, and did
follow-up investigation by phone on 19 Dec 97, and on-site on 20 Dec 97.
B.

SEQUENCE AND DOCUMENTATION OF TASKING

5.
In accordance with the winter plan organized by the [Demining group] Regional
Mines Officer (RMO) for Banja Luka Region, [name excised], the Banja Luka Demining
Platoon, the Minefield Marking and Survey (MMS) Team, and an office of three staff deployed
to the Trebinje region to conduct demining operations. This was to continue for the period of
December 97 to March 98 approximately, while there was too much snow and bad weather to
demine in the Banja Luka region.
6.
The recce team deployed on 1 Dec 97, followed by the demining platoon on 3
Dec 97. The minefield incorporating the area of grid reference BN 743 291 was located with
the help of local knowledge, and was discovered to have many mines, mostly PMR-2A and
PMA-2. The minefield encompassed several houses, the approach to a village and church,
and two power lines. The villagers did not stay overnight in their village, due to lack of
security, but spent the days there working on making their homes and fields safe for normal
work. The demining operation was assisting in increasing local security, so was of sufficient
priority for clearance.
C.

SOPS AND TECHNICAL GUIDELINES

7.
[Demining group] SOPs and technical guidelines were used and were being
followed in general, but with some specific discrepancies which are discussed in detail in
following sections. In brief, these are:
a.
access lanes for control of movement were not being used.
b.
supervision was not up to the level required by SOP/Technical Guidelines.
c.
proper rest and equipment areas were not being enforced.
d.
section operations were not observing SOPs with respect to house clearing
restrictions.
8.
The location of the mine which caused the accident was under the corner of a
cement doorstep. This introduces a problem, as the SOPs state that doorways are to be part
of house clearance operations, not area clearance operations. SOP 3.18 states that building
clearance operations are only to be handled by specialized EOD personnel. Neither the
SOPs nor the Technical Guidelines state exactly where area clearance ends and house
clearance. It should be made clear in the SOPs exactly where the boundaries are between
area clearance and house clearance.
9.
It should also be noted that neither the MD-8 metal detector nor the prodder
function effectively in the type of soil found at this demining site. The soil is too metallic for
the metal detector, and is extremely rocky, meaning that every probe of a prodder encounters
an object, which in turn means that excavation must be done to discover and remove that
object. The end result is clearing almost totally by excavation. The SOPs address this
problem and describe approved methods of dealing with it.
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10.
The demining section should have been using excavation as a clearing method
in the areas where the rocks were too many or too large for the prodder to be effective.
Paragraph 20 of the Synopsis of the Technical Guidelines covers this and also recommends
extra supervision in such instances.
D.

GEOGRAPHY

11.
The location of the accident site is on Route 20, 11 km South West from the
centre of the city of Trebinje, on the West side of the road. (The city hospital is at this centre
of Trebinje.)
Map Sheet: Dubrovnik, Croatia, Former Yugoslavia, 1:50,000; Edition 6-DMA, Series M709,
Sheet 2780-III. Grid Reference: BN 743291. Location: at rear of house on West side of road.
12.
The weather on the day of the accident was cloudy with no rain, and cold. There
was little wind.
13.
The soil is metallic in content, causing the MD-8 mine detector to signal detection
of metal on a continuous basis. The deminers were therefore using only prodders for
demining.
14.
The local terrain at the accident is shown on the sketch at Annex B. The area
being cleared is the yard of a house, delineated clearly by a paved road and stone walls. The
ground is extremely difficult for demining, being extremely rocky, with very thin soil. Rocks
vary in size and shape from small pebbles to the size of a house. Most of the rocks in the
area of the accident were irregular in shape and varying from the size of a coin to the size of a
football. The density of rocks and their size makes it difficult for the prodder to get between
them, or to move them easily.
E.

SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING

15.
The sketch of the site at Annex B shows the site to be a house and its
surrounding yard. This task was given to one section. The section divided responsibilities
between the three teams of two persons each, keeping 25 metres safety distance between
team lanes. The sketch shows direction of clearing.
16.
Each team marked its progress by moving parallel to the demarcation tape and
unrolling a tape to mark the 1 metre lane as they cleared. In most areas, the new lane was to
the left of the previous one, so the minetape was being unrolled on the left side. As each lane
was finished, the demarcation safety tape was rolled up and then used to mark the new side
of the new lane.
17.
Cleared areas and uncleared areas were clearly marked using blue mine tape.
The demarcations of the property site were obvious to see and were marked: the road, the
house itself, the stone walls surrounding the property. All entrances to the house were
blocked by mine tape.
18.
Within the cleared areas there were no marked visitor or access lanes. The
entire cleared areas were being used as access areas by the section. Proper rest and
equipment areas were not being enforced.
19.
The section should have had clearly marked access routes, and equipment and
rest areas the correct safety distance – 100 metres - from the nearest mined area.
F.

SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE

20.
Supervision on the site was adequate in general, but inadequate at the section
site where the accident occurred, in that persons moved from their supervisory locations. The
overall platoon site was in two separate locations with approximately 1 kilometre between
them. Two of the sections of the demining platoon were at a site to the southwest of the
accident site, and the third section was at the site where the accident occurred. The platoon
headquarters and the ambulance were centrally located near the T- junction (black road with
red road on the map) at grid reference BN 735 287, a distance of 1.2 km by road and two
minutes in time.
21.
The section commanders were with their sections at all times. The platoon
commander and his 2IC alternate staying at the platoon headquarters location and moving
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from section to section. On the afternoon of the accident, the platoon commander had gone
with the RMO to the demolition site to destroy live mines, leaving the platoon 2IC in charge.
22.
At the site where the accident occurred there were some discrepancies from the
discipline procedures given in the Technical Guidelines and the SOPs. There were no
common access routes from the road, through the recently cleared areas, to the areas of
current work. This resulted in the section moving from the safe area on the road,
indiscriminately through the cleared area, to reach the area of current work. The following
discrepancies from a disciplined site were observed on the visit on 18 Dec:
a.
Although the control point was on the paved road, and well-marked, the section
had taken shortcuts in procedures for convenience. Section rest breaks were taken on the
patio adjacent to the southwest wall of the house, and stores and equipment were also stored
there. This resulted in an increase of traffic from clearance lanes to the house for breaks or
for equipment, as opposed to going from clearance lanes out to the road. The Technical
Guidelines require a secure area and recommend near the control point for stores. The
Technical Guidelines also call for designated access routes of two metres width into demining
areas for the specific purpose of imposing control over movement and reducing the
indiscriminate movement over broader areas than necessary.
b.
Rest areas are to be a minimum of 100 metres from the uncleared areas. The
section was resting on the patio, with the nearest uncleared area only one to two metres
away.
c.
Although the WC/toilet area was designated near the control point, and out on
the road where it was safe, the deminer [victim] had gone to the section rest area on the
patio, near the uncleared area, to get his equipment. He felt an urgent need to go to the
toilet, and moved into a private corner for this purpose, and stepped on a mine. Although the
area was previously cleared where he stood, and was marked clear, it was also a violation of
Technical Guidelines for him to have been taking his break there, storing his equipment there,
and going to the toilet there.
d.
The accident occurred at 1515 hours, nearing the end of the working day, as
light begins to fade. The section leader had moved to the northeast side of the house and
had started the measuring of his square metres for the day. Deminer [the victim] decided to
go up to the patio early to collect his kit while his partner was clearing in the lane. The
Technical Guidelines call for one deminer of a team to be working in the lane, while the other
monitors and supports.
23.
Supervision is required at all times, meaning that supervision is all that the
section leader should have been doing while clearing was going on. No deminers should
have left his partner unsupported, as [the victim] did.
G.

QUALITY ASSURANCE/QUALITY CONTROL

24.
Quality Assurance was addressed initially by the process of ensuring that each
deminer was put through the [Demining group] training course and that the SOPs and
Technical Guidelines of the [Demining group] were in place for the platoon working in
Trebinje. The Technical Guidelines state that QA when using prodding and excavation
techniques without mine detectors is difficult, and can only be met by additional supervision.
Close supervision is emphasized repeatedly by the Technical Guidelines. Close supervision
was not strong for the Trebinje operation in that only the section leader was available to
supervise during the day of the accident, and he divided his time between supervision and
other tasks which he needed to do, such as measuring his square metres cleared for his daily
report.
25.
Mine detectors are an item of detection equipment. Use of mine detectors
provides better QC and safety than use of prodders alone. By definition, use of mine
detectors and prodders together is more effective than use of prodders alone. Since the MD8 detector does not work in the metallic soil found in much of Herzegovina, the safety risk is
increased to deminers in metallic soil areas. Since mine detectors exist which do work in
metallic soil, these should be procured. Not doing so is adding to the safety risk.
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26.
There was a lack of discipline, whereby there were deviations from the standard
control procedures laid down by the Technical Guidelines. These will be elaborated in
conclusions.
27.
The demining platoon and section should have known from the planning and
survey phases of the operation that the mine detector would not work effectively, and that
they would have to use prodding and excavation to do clearance. The Quality Control on
prodding is the distance, depth and method of prodding. When the prodder hits a hard object,
or cannot penetrate the soil, the Technical Guidelines stipulate that excavation techniques
must be used, and describes these techniques in detail. The deminers should have been
using excavation techniques in accordance with the Technical Guidelines. Deminers who
were not excavating in the rocks where prodders did not work were not demining to
humanitarian standards.
H.

COMMUNICATIONS

28.
Communications at the time of the accident were normal for the site and were
working well. VHF hand-held radio was used to call for the ambulance and the call received
immediately. The office in Trebinje monitored the call and called the hospital immediately,
then used office communications to call SFOR to arrange helicopter transport in case it was
needed.
29.
Communications from the Trebinje field office to the offices in Sarajevo and
Mostar do not work well. It is difficult to get calls through via PTT lines. The satellite
telephone works but it is often in transit and not receiving calls. HF radio does not work well,
likely from siting of antenna, but this did not affect the emergency.
I.

MEDICAL

30.
The deminers have had first aid training, and all carry a field dressing in their
pocket. The deminer nearest to the casualty was on site in a matter of seconds, and had a
bandage on the wound area within a minute. The next deminer on site assisted, and the
deminer was bandaged and carried to the road side within three minutes. A call for medevac
was made within 10 seconds of the explosion
31.
The platoon medic is experienced and trained, and was sitting in his ambulance
monitoring the radio when the call for assistance was made. His ambulance was properly
equipped and in good mechanical shape. He was approximately two minutes drive from the
accident site, as he was covering two section clearing sites in the same vicinity. The
ambulance reached the roadside at the accident site within 2-3 minutes of the explosion, and
was waiting as the deminers carried the casualty to the ambulance. The medic checked and
reinforced the bandages as the ambulance drove to the hospital.
32.
It is roughly 10 minutes by road to the hospital. The [Demining group] office had
called the hospital, and the ambulance was met at the door by the duty doctor, staff and a
gurney. The casualty was operated on immediately and his left foot was amputated. A
medical report is attached as Annex E.
33.
The platoon had not carried out medevac rehearsals in the three weeks that they
had been in Trebinje. The Supervisor, the Platoon Leader, the Deputy Platoon Leader and
the medic had done reconnaissance and knew where the hospital was and the location of its
emergency entrance.
J.

PERSONS INVOLVED

34.
The key persons involved in the demining operation where the accident occurred
are:
Casualty
(team 3 member)
RMO
Deputy Demining Platoon Leader
Demining Section Leader
Team 1 member
Team 1 member
Team 2 member
Team 2 member
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Team 3 member
Operations Assistant
K.

EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS

35.
Metal detectors were not used in this demining site as the only detectors
available were the MD-8, which do not work in the metallic soil. No mine detectors which
would work in metallic soil were available.
36.
The primary piece of equipment for clearing in this minefield was the prodder.
There were not enough prodders for everybody in the platoon, so some were using bayonets.
The section at the demining site was using prodders and excavating trowels, but not mine
detectors. To support the prodder and bayonet when in rocky soil, each demining team had
trowels as well as field scissors and small saws.
L.

DRESS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

37.
The protective vest, helmet, and visor issued by [Demining group] were worn by
all members of the platoon when required. No other special demining protective equipment
such as boots or gloves were available. Some members have [Demining group] issue
coveralls, and some do not, due to the garments wearing out.
M.

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES

38.
The following account summarizes the responses to questions and statements
by the members of the [demining group] Banja Luka demining platoon who were involved in
the mine accident on 17 December, 1997. The persons whose statements are involved are
those listed in Section J – Persons Involved. Statements are attached at Annex F.
39.
This chronology of events is best read in conjunction with the Field Sketch,
Annex B . The site has three gates, and each section was assigned a clearance area through
one of the gates. As the house if faced from the road, Team 1 started on the right extreme
edge of the clearance area when commencing clearing operations, Team 2 started opposite
the middle of the house, and Team 3 started on the left flank. As one lane was cleared, the
new lane was started on the left of the old one, so the cleared area was growing towards the
left.
40.
In the two weeks of demining before 17 Dec, Team 1 had cleared up to the
house, then in the back of the house as far to the left (South) as the South-West corner of the
protruding back room of the house. On 17 Dec, they were started on a set of lanes to the
south of their previous work, clearing from West (# 10 on the sketch) to East (house wall near
# 1). They were working backwards (West to East) from their normal direction (East to West)
because if they worked from this direction, they would be beyond 25 metres from the nearest
deminer of Team 2, and this would enable both teams to work concurrently.
41.
In the two weeks preceding 17 Dec, Team 2 had progressed quickly from their
starting lane along the stone wall joining the North East corner of the house to the road. The
short lanes meant that they were soon at the 25 m distance from Team 3 to their left. The
section leader directed that they move to the rear of the house, clear a 1 metre lane along the
back of the house, then clear towards the rear of the property, shifting right as each lane was
completed. The 1 metre lane was cleared five or six days before 17 Dec, along the West side
of the main part of the house, parallel to the stairs. This is shown clearly on the large-scale
sketch, Annex C . When Team 3 had cleared enough lanes to put them more than 25 metres
to the left of Team 2, the Section Leader directed Team 2 back to the main part of the yard.
On 17 Dec, Team 2 was clearing from # 8 on the sketch towards # 7 on the sketch.
42.
In the two weeks before 17 Dec, Team 3 (which included the mine casualty) had
cleared lanes starting roughly at Gate 3 and moving steadily left. On 17 Dec, they were
approaching # 3 on the sketch.
43.
On 17 Dec, Team 1 was clearing from West (#10 on the sketch) to East towards
the back of the house, ending each lane at the 1 metre lane along the back of the house
which had been cleared by Team 2. After the first of these West to East lanes (from # 10 to #
1 on the sketch), they did a right turn (to the South) and cleared one lane at right angles to
their initial lane, and parallel to the 1 metre clear lane along the back wall of the house, thus
making the clear lane along that back wall 2 metres wide. They then returned to doing West
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to East lanes. The clearing deminer had nearly finished the second lane towards the house
when they stopped for the Section mid-afternoon break at 1440 hrs. At 1500 hrs, when the
break was over, Team 2 finished the second lane, gathered their materials, and moved to
start the third lane. The deminer [name excised] was making his entry into the third lane, at #
4 on the sketch, and was facing South, when he heard the explosion and turned his head to
see a man flying in the air. His team-mate was 25 metres to his North, monitoring his work,
but in a position where he could not see the area of the explosion.
44.
On 17 Dec, Team 2 was clearing lanes from East to West, and were near the
end of a lane when they stopped for Section break at 1440 hrs. At 1500 hrs, they returned to
their lane, finished it and began to collect their tools and roll up the mine tape in preparation
for starting the next lane. The were working at # 7 and # 8 on the sketch when they heard the
explosion.
45.
On 17 Dec, Team 3 was working on the far left, clearing lanes. They continued
this after the end of Section break at 1500 hrs. [Name excised] was clearing, at # 3 on the
sketch, and [the victim] was monitoring from the road 25 metres distant, # 2 on the sketch.
[Name excised] had his back to the road. He saw [the Victim] on the road, but for the five
minutes before the explosion, he had not looked that way, nor had he any reason to think [the
victim] had moved. When he heard the explosion he thought it was another team in trouble.
46.
[The victim] had walked from his monitoring position, # 2 on the sketch, probably
through gate number 2, and up to the concrete patio. He said that it was nearing the end of
the day and he was going to pick up some of his equipment which had been left there during
the break. He could see his team-mate clearly from all points on his walk from the road to the
patio. Team 2 were both on their hands and knees working in their lane area, and did not see
him. [Name excised] of Team 1 was just starting to clear into a new lane. He was to the
West of the explosion site, facing South, # 4 on the sketch, and he did not see [the victim]
moving around near the house. [Name excised] was further North, monitoring his partner
from 25 metres away, and the back of the house and the patio were not in his view. He did
not see [the victim]. The section leader was around the North end of the house and could not
see the back of the house. He did not see [the victim] moving around.
47.
[The victim] said that he felt an urgent need to go to the toilet while he was at the
patio, # 9 on the sketch. He descended the steps from the patio, turned left in the cleared
lane, now 2 metres wide, and approached the privacy of the corner (# 1 on the sketch). At
the corner of the concrete slab outside the door to the back room of the house, he stepped on
a mine.
48.
At the sound of the explosion, deminer [name excised] turned his head to see a
man “flying through the air”. He ran to assist, pulling his field dressing from his pocket, and
applying it to [the victim]’s left leg immediately. [Name excised] arrived running and calling for
the ambulance on the radio. [Name excised] also arrived within seconds and they all applied
first aid, and with the aid of the other members of the section, carried [the victim] immediately
to the road. The ambulance arrived at the house as [the victim] was brought to the road, a
time of approximately two minutes. They loaded [the victim] in with the medic and headed to
the hospital in Trebinje.
49.
Predrag was in the [Demining group] office in the Leotar Hotel when he heard
the call for medevac on the HF radio. He immediately called the hospital and alerted them.
When the ambulance arrived, within approximately ten minutes, the duty doctor was waiting
at the door, and took [the victim] direct to the operating room. Predrag had also called SFOR
and arranged for a helicopter in case one was needed.
N.

DETAILS OF THE MINE INVOLVED

50.
The evidence at the blast site is consistent with a PMA-2. The dimensions of the
crater as taken by Maj [name excised] are listed below and shown on the sketch attached as
Annex G:
surface diameter:
30 cm
bottom diameter
05 cm
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depth
16 cm
depth of black ring caused by explosive
06 cm
soil and rocks were scattered around in no apparent pattern
51.
Maj [name excised] stated that the black ring of explosive in the dirt could
indicate the top of the mine; if so, then this indicates a mine buried at 6 cm depth.
52.
The soil is mixed rock and earth. A similar hole dug nearby confirmed that this
was consistent in the immediate area. The concrete doorstep slab which was over the mine
was 4 cm thick, and had been broken by the mine blast, leaving clean, newly-broken pieces
at the edge of the mine blast debris.
53.
The concrete slab was reassembled as best possible, revealing that the location
of the mine crater was centred under the South West corner of the concrete slab. Some of
the corners of the concrete slab are square, but it is possible that the corner in question was
chipped off or rounded. If it was square, then the mine was under the concrete. If it was
rounded, the mine fuse may have been under earth only, at the corner of the slab. Either
way, it indicates a carefully placed mine which could have been difficult to detect. Since this
mine was used in a doorway, it can also be considered a booby-trap of a part of a building,
which brings the problem into the realm of house clearance rather than area clearance. (See
sketch at Annex D).
N.

SUMMARY

54.
The area where [The victim] was walking when he stepped on a mine had been
cleared earlier in the same day. A one metre lane cleared 5 or six days earlier adjacent to
the back of the house was expanded on 17 Dec to a two metre lane. After each lane was
cleared, the entire section had been using it to traverse the back of the house if they had
needed to move there. [The victim] stepped on a mine that was missed by clearance.
55.
The mine was likely a PMA 2, likely buried at about 6 cm under the corner of a
concrete slab doorstep, and missed by the clearance deminer.
56.

Medevac procedures worked very well.

57.
SOP procedures to maintain a disciplined control of movement were not being
followed thoroughly. These would have had no impact on whether the mine was missed or
not, but would have reduced the traffic over the missed mine.
58.
Supervision and monitoring were not at 100%. More effort should have been put
into supervision in accordance with the SOPs and Technical Guidelines. It is possible that
increased supervision may have observed a fault in clearing around the doorstep where the
mine had been place, which in turn may have led to the discovery of the mine.
O.

CONCLUSIONS

59.

This was a preventable accident.

60.
The mine was missed by the by Team 1 early on 17 December, 1997, while
clearing around the back doorstep of the house in their task area. The mine was probably
buried with the top of the body of the mine at about 6 cm, with the top of the plunger about 3
cm below the ground. It should have been found by prodding/excavation.
61.
The SOPs for supervision emphasize the increased need for supervision and
monitoring when mine detectors are not being used. This was not done at this site during the
day of the accident, and could have contributed to the mine being missed.
62.
The SOPs for control of movement require access routes and controlled
movement through a minefield, including the cleared area. This is for the purpose of reducing
movement over indiscriminate areas, and should have been in effect at this accident site.
63.
Clearance procedures are well described in the Technical Guidelines. It the mine
detector does not work effectively, then manual prodding is to be used. When the prodder
hits a hard object, or when it cannot penetrate the soil, then excavation is the technique to be
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used. When using a prodding or excavating technique, the supervision should be increased.
These Technical Guidelines must be followed.
P.

RECOMMENDATIONS

64.
That the Banja Luka platoon undergo a retraining period which will emphasize
the procedures for constant supervision and monitoring of prodding and excavation drills.
This should include emphasis on a standardized prodding and excavating drill for clearing in
rocky metallic soil, which will accept that speed will be slow, but that clearing will be sure.
65.
That the procedures given in the [Demining group] SOPs and Technical
Guidelines for safe and thorough clearing, for constant supervision and monitoring, and for
control of movement in a demining site be re-emphasized to all demining agencies in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
66.
That the Technical Guidelines have the page numbers in the “Contents”
adjusted, that the “Synopsis” be edited to reduce the possibility of safety misunderstandings,
and that a detailed numbering system be adopted for ease of reference.
67.

No disciplinary procedures are recommended.

Signed: Regional Manager, Operations Assistant, Technical Adviser

ANNEXES: (not made available)
Annex A.
Terms of Reference of Board of Inquiry
Annex B.
Sketch of section clearing site where accident occurred
Annex C.
Sketch of back of house where accident occurred
Annex D.
Sketch of doorway where accident occurred
Annex E.
Medical report on [The victim]
Annex F.
Statements of witnesses
Annex G. Sketch of crater measurements
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